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Abstract 
This paper argues that whilst Bentham’s logic, like all human activity, had pragmatic goals, 
so that all knowledge was subject to utilitarian evaluation, he clearly distinguished between 
utility and truth. § I presents the textual evidence that Bentham believed that truth was 
communicable in propositions relating to real entities, and discusses the limits to the 
information which true propositions could impart. It is argued further that the processes of 
phraseoplerosis and paraphrasis revealed which propositions relating to fictitious entities 
could be translated into propositions capable of bearing truth (i.e. relating to real entities). In 
§ II an attempt is made to paraphrase ‘truth’, and the result indicates that Bentham did 
indeed interpret true as meaning ‘corresponds to the real’. In § III, it is argued that 
Bentham’s concept of truth combined both an objective element, according to which truth was 
understood as correspondence with reality, and a subjective element, according to which 
truth is simply an adjunct to subjective belief, while veracity relates to the accurate reporting 
of belief. The bridge between these elements was formed by the methods of Baconian 
induction, and the universal human ability to interpret the evidence arising from sensory data. 
Progress towards truth depended on the free exchange of the available empirical evidence, 
and of the inferences drawn therefrom. § IV discusses the relation between Bentham’s logic 
and pragmatism and fictionalism respectively, and argues that whilst Bentham’s thought 
anticipates central elements of both philosophies, it cannot consistently be characterized as 
either pragmatist or fictionalist, since ultimately, it is the rooting of the fictitious entity utility 
in the real entities of pleasure and pain which makes it the only viable moral principle. The 
value of true propositions is indeed to be subjected to utilitarian evaluation, but the very 
possibility of utilitarian evaluation itself depends on the existence of true propositions. § V 
investigates possible tensions between truth and utility, and asks where Bentham’s ultimate 
loyalty lies. It is argued that whilst the possibility of justified duplicity must, on any utilitarian 
view, remain on the table, Bentham’s recognition that the evidence of sense experience is 
available to all renders the probability of a successful perpetration of a utilitarian ‘noble lie’ 
vanishingly small. 
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Introduction
1
 
To investigate the relationship between truth and utility in Bentham’s thought is to 
investigate the relationship between the faculty of understanding and the faculty of 
will, since, to abbreviate outrageously, the understanding is governed by truth, and the 
will by utility. So interpreted, an obvious answer emerges to the question of this paper. 
Sentient beings act, react, and indeed think in response to a natural desire for pleasure 
and aversion to pain:  
Every operation of the mind, and thence every operation of the body, is the 
result of an exercise of the will or volitional faculty.—The volitional 
faculty is a branch of the appetitive faculty: i.e. that faculty in which desire, 
in all its several modifications, has place. Desire has for its object either 
pleasure or pain, or what is commonly the case a mixture of both in ever-
varying and unascertainable proportions.
2
 
Thought is not only laborious, and thereby painful, but difficult, and is therefore only 
rationally explicable in terms of an anticipated pay off in pleasure experienced or pain 
avoided. In the absence of the motivational impetus of pleasure and pain—without, 
that is to say a desire for utility, not necessarily general utility, since personal or 
sectional utility will serve—the acquisition of accurate knowledge about the world, 
that is of truth, is, to multiply yet further the number of fictitious entities already 
deployed in this single paragraph, an effect without a cause. What is of interest to 
human beings is that which constitutes a source of pleasure or pain to them. For 
Bentham, the foundational principle of rationality is that the sensation of pleasure is to 
be preferred to that of pain. Is this principle true? Not perhaps analytically or logically, 
but Bentham is confident that, whether we engage in introspection or observation, we 
will quickly encounter an abundance of empirical evidence in its favour, and an 
                                            
1
 A version of this paper was presented in December 2011 at ‘New Directions in Bentham Studies: An 
International Symposium’ at UCL Laws. I am grateful to the participants in the symposium for their 
comments, and would like to express particular thanks to Xiaobo Zhai and Philip Schofield for their 
wisdom and their patience in the face of repeated queries on the subject of truth and utility. Their 
insights have saved me from many errors and misunderstandings, while those which remain are mine.  
2
 ‘Logic’, ci. 409–10 (The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. J. Bowring, 11 vols. Edinburgh, 1838–43 
(henceforth Bowring), viii. 279). 
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absence of evidence to the contrary.
3
 
 So basic is this evaluative premise that Bentham asserts ‘goodness’ and 
‘badness’, meaning respectively ‘pleasure-giving' and ‘pain-giving’, to have been 
among the earliest qualities designated in human language:  
Goodness and badness, of all qualities, experienced or imaginable, these 
are the very first that would present themselves to notice—these are the 
very first  that would obtain names. Desire of pleasure and of exemption 
from pain, in one word interest, being in some shape or other the source of 
every thought as  well as the cause of every action, ... names plainly and 
immediately expressive of the two opposite modes of relation in which 
those objects would be continually bearing relation to each man’s 
interest ... would be among the very earliest to which the faculty of 
discourse would give existence.
4
  
The desire for pleasure and aversion to pain guides human agents in their exploration 
of the world, and thus guides thought. If we might for the moment identify truth with 
knowledge, conscious of the need to return to the investigation of their relation in due 
course, it seems further obvious that the value of truth should be assessed in terms of 
its contribution to satisfying this basic human desire: ‘[E]xcept in so far as in some 
shape or other it leads to and is productive of well-being—a balance on the side of 
happiness—what is the value of all the knowledge in the world?—Just nothing.’5 
However, what is clear, both from this quotation and from his repeated criticisms that 
                                            
3
 Whereas the principle of sympathy and antipathy fails as a moral principle because it lacks any 
objective standard—precisely because, that is to say, it makes no testable claims to the truth of its 
dictates, since it makes no appeal to evidence—the principle of asceticism does proffer an objective 
standard, does speak in the language of empirically testable fact. Instead, the principle of asceticism is 
to be rejected simply because it contradicts this foundational premise and is, therefore, in effect, simply 
insane. See An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (henceforth IPML), ed. J.H. 
Burns and H.L.A. Hart, Oxford, 1996 (CW), pp. 19–21. 
4
 ‘Ontology’, UC cii. 42 (De l’ontologie et autres textes sur les fictions, eds. P. Schofield, J-P. Cléro & 
C. Laval, Paris, 1997, p. 98 (Bowring, viii. 203)). 
5
 ‘Logic’, UC ci. 153 (Bowring, viii. 233). See also UC ci. 153 (Bowring, viii. 232): ‘In point of use, of 
real utility, and thence in point of real worth and true dignity, in so far as they are separate or separable, 
knowledge is inferior to art: so much so, that separated from art, all the knowledge which the human 
mind is capable of containing is of no use.’; IPML (CW), p. 201, where, in explaining the origin of the 
religious sanction as a supplement to the political, Bentham notes: ‘it is thought necessary, or at least 
useful (without which the truth of the doctrine would be nothing to the purpose) to inculcate into the 
minds of the people the belief of the existence of a power ... not liable to the same deficiencies.’ 
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certain methods or rules are consonant neither with truth nor utility,
6
 is that Bentham 
avoids the move seemingly made by William James, of simply identifying truth with 
utility.
7
 There are, for Bentham, two separate concepts in play, though he never 
provides us with an extended discussion of the relation between them. 
 Bentham’s logic is indeed, as Postema notes, entirely pragmatic in origin,8 and 
without doubt Bentham was committed to evaluating everything according to its 
consequences. For him, the confusion in language arising from the necessary use of 
names of fictitious entities in law has had appalling consequences, while his method 
for the ascription of meaning and truth is capable of preventing such consequences in 
future. The pragmatic necessity to impose order on the potential chaos of reality 
demands the invention of a host of fictitious entities which are essential to interpret 
reality in all areas of life. Logic provides a method for ‘giving, to the best advantage, 
direction to the human mind, in its pursuit of any object or purpose’,9 while the end of 
logic, as of all rational action, is well-being. Bentham then, explicitly subjects all 
knowledge to utilitarian evaluation, but also clearly differentiates between truth and 
utility. 
 The first accurate assertion we can make about both truth and utility is that 
both are names of fictitious entities, which is to say that neither exists as an object in 
the physical world. Both are qualities, properties of propositions or statements on the 
one hand, and of physical objects, rules or actions on the other. For Bentham, the 
problem with language, a construction of the human mind, is that as soon as it evolves 
beyond the declaration of desire or aversion towards particular existing objects, it 
necessarily ascribes existence to things which have none. He asserts that all language 
which deploys the names of anything other than really existing entities is figurative, 
or metaphorical,
10
 while ‘of names that are not names of things, there are abundantly 
                                            
6
 See, for instance, IPML (CW), p. 102; Chrestomathia, eds. M.J. Smith and W.H. Burston, Oxford, 
1983 (CW), p. 346; ‘Political Fallacies’, UC ciii. 434 (Bowring, ii. 458); ‘Rationale of Reward’, 
Bowring, ii. 263–4; ‘General View of a complete code of laws’, Bowring, iii. 190. 
7
 See ‘Pragmatism: A new name for some old ways of thinking’ (first published in 1907), in William 
James Pragmatism in focus, ed, D. Olin, London & New York, 1992, pp. 13–142, at pp. 101–2; and see 
the discussion in § IV below. 
8
 See G. Postema, ‘Fact, fictions and law: Bentham on the foundations of evidence’, in W.L. Twining 
ed., Facts in Law, Wiesbaden, 1983, pp. 37–64, at p. 50. 
9
 ‘Logic’, UC ci. 92 (Bowring, viii. 219). 
10
 See ‘Universal Grammar’, UC cii. 466, (Bowring, viii. 331). 
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more than of names that are’.11 As such, nearly all of the propositions asserted in 
language are fictional, that is, they are strictly speaking falsehoods. It is true that the 
division between real and fictitious entities occurs entirely within language, but the 
linguistic division between names which have referents in the world, and names 
which have no such referents, nevertheless reflects, for Bentham, an ontological 
distinction between things which exist, and things which do not. 
 Jackson is quite correct in asserting that for Bentham the reality attributed to 
real entities ‘is a discursive construction: a claim to reality made within discourse’,12 
but that simply reflects the facts that language is only the only instrument by which 
humans can communicate any assertions, and that that instrument necessarily 
misdescribes the world. Thus, with Bentham, ‘Coæval with the very first steps that 
can be taken in the endeavour to give a clear explanation of the true nature of 
language must be the intimation given of the distinction between real and fictitious 
entities, and the correspondent distinction between names of real and names of 
fictitious entities.’13 That is to say, there are two parallel distinctions, not one, and 
those distinctions match up precisely in the sense that names of fictitious entities 
designate things which do not exist, whilst names of real entities designate things 
which do. For Bentham reality, like its synonym existence,
14
 is a fictitious entity, a 
quality ascribed in language to things which exist: ‘Of every other entity, real or 
fictitious, either existence or non-existence is at all times predicable. Whether such 
other entity be real or fictitious, its existence is of course a fictitious entity’.15 The 
origins of language in the denomination of particular objects set a pattern which 
human beings in their continuing encounters with the physical world generalized in 
developing the spectacularly useful capacities for abstraction and generalization. 
Identification and organization of observed regularities facilitated prediction, but the 
expression of those regularities in abstract terms introduced confusion into thought 
about what was real and what was not. 
                                            
11
 ‘Logic’, UC ci. 340 (Bowring, viii. 262).  
12
 B.S. Jackson, ‘Bentham, Truth and the Semiotics of Law’, in Current Legal Problems 51 (1998), 
493–531, at 498. 
13
 ‘Universal Grammar’, UC cii. 462 (Bowring, viii. 331). 
14
 See UC cii. 14 (De l’ontologie, p. 174 (Bowring viii. 196)): ‘Whatsoever claim an object belonging 
to the class of bodies may be considered as possessing to the attribute of reality, i.e. of existence, every 
object belonging to the class of perceptions will be found to possess a still better title’. 
15
 ‘Ontology’, UC cii. 74 (De l’ontologie, p. 150 (Bowring, viii. 210)). 
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In every species of knowledge, disorder in language is at once the effect 
and the cause of ignorance and error. Nomenclature can only be perfected 
in proportion as truth is discovered. It is impossible to speak correctly, 
unless we think correctly; and it is impossible to think correctly whilst 
words are employed for registering our ideas, which words are so 
constituted that it is not possible to form them into propositions which 
shall not be false.
16
   
 
Nevertheless, any demand to eliminate fictitious entities from language, so that it 
might simply reflect the world, is a demand that the human capacity to communicate 
verbally be reduced to the level of animals unable to form abstract concepts, unable, 
that is, to think in general or abstract terms. 
 
§ I. Truth and the names of real and fictitious entities. 
What then, distinguishes names of real entities from names of fictitious ones? The 
name of a real entity designates ‘an entity to which, on the occasion and for the 
purpose of discourse, existence is really meant to be ascribed’.17 Bentham is less than 
clear in his treatment of the category of real entities, but for the most part he is ready 
to admit to that category two sorts of things, namely real physical entities on the one 
hand, which are particular substances (that is, essentially, things or animals),
18
 and, on 
the other, certain psychical entities (that is sensations,
19
 of which our experience and 
observation suggests that all animals are capable, and impressions and ideas,
20
 the 
capacity for which, according to our experience and observation, varies between 
                                            
16
 ‘View of a complete code of laws’, Bowring, iii. 171. 
17
 De l’ontologie, p. 164 (Bowring, viii. 196). 
18
 See ‘Preparatory Principles Inserenda’ (henceforth ‘PPI’), UC lxix. 241; ‘Logic’, UC ci. 341 
(Bowring, viii. 262). 
19
 Notably, of course, pain, pleasure, which in combination with will, perform all the heavy lifting in 
making sense of abstract legal and moral words: see A Comment on the Commentaries and a Fragment 
on Government, ed. J. H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, London, 1977 (CW), p. 495 n; Of the Limits of the 
Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, ed. P. Schofield, Oxford, 2010 (CW), p. 286.   
20
 See Chrestomathia (CW), p. 271 n; ‘Logic’, UC ci. 347 (Bowring, viii. 267); UC ci. 417. Ideas, for 
Bentham, are present to memory, that is, are formed by recalling the images which constitute the 
impressions deposited by real entities. He also asserts simultaneously in at least one passage, however, 
(Chrestomathia (CW), ‘Appendix IV’, p. 265–6 n.) that general ideas are fictitious entities, and that 
they are real entities, so long as they produce ‘mental images’. I think this passage has to be 
disregarded, since, if this were Bentham’s considered position, not only would, for instance, 
‘obligation’ arguably qualify as a real entity—since propositions containing that word call to mind 
archetypal images of real entities—but so would the purely imaginary combinations of images of real 
entities which Bentham designates as fabulous entities—since the idea of a golden mountain, for 
instance, definitely produces a mental image in the mind.  
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animals, with human beings set apart by their facility for forming and exchanging the 
latter) to which encounters with real physical entities give rise in  the sensate subset of 
real physical entities. 
 It is the facility for forming and exchanging ideas, or, in a word, language, 
which gives rise to the designation of things which do not, in fact, exist. ‘A fictitious 
entity is an entity to which, though by the grammatical form of the discourse 
employed in speaking of it existence is ascribed, yet in truth and reality existence is 
not meant to be ascribed.’ 21 Bentham’s assertion is that the names of fictitious entities, 
that is, crudely, abstract terms,
22
 were originally simply borrowed from those of real 
entities, while the connection with the original images has been lost or forgotten. 
Propositions featuring fictitious entities as subjects, strictly understood, had no 
referents in the real world, made no assertions about the real world, and were 
therefore, in and of themselves, either meaningless or false. The key to making sense 
of such fictitious names, to asserting and exchanging truth in relation to them, lay in 
possibility of their connection with the names of real entities, in their explication in 
terms of real entities: 
 
A proposition having for its subject the name of a fictitious entity is not 
clearly understood any further than as it can be translated into a 
correspondent proposition having for its subject the name of some real 
entity. Falsehood, then, or nonsense, is the only import, of which, 
abstractedly from all relations to any proposition having for its subject the 
name of some real entity, a proposition having for its subject the name of a 
fictitious entity is susceptible.
23
 
 
                                            
21
 UC cii. 16 (De l’ontologie, p. 164 (Bowring, viii. 197)). See also UC cii. 24 (De l’ontologie, p. 86 
(Bowring, viii. 198)); Bowring, viii. 325.  
22
 See ‘Logic’, Bowring, viii. 334: ‘Abstract entities can no otherwise be expressed than by fiction.’ 
23
 ‘A Table of the Springs of Action. Introduction’, in Deontology, together with A Table of the Springs 
of Action and the Article on Utilitarianism, ed. A. Goldworth, Oxford, 1983 (CW), p.75. See also 
‘Logic’, UC ci. 217 (Bowring, viii. 246): ‘Nothing has no properties. A fictitious entity, being as this 
its name imports—being, by the very supposition, a mere nothing, can not of itself have any properties: 
no proposition by which any property is ascribed to it can therefore be in itself and of itself a true one, 
nor therefore an instructive one: whatsoever of truth is capable of belonging to it can not belong to it in 
any other character than that of the representative of—the intended and supposed equivalent and 
adequate succedaneum of—some proposition having for its subject some real entity.’ 
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Language may indeed be ‘an instrument for the communication of thought from one 
mind to another’,24 but language, because of the unavoidable resort to the employment 
of names of fictitious entities as if they were real entities, necessarily deceives.
25
 
Because fictitious entities are not associated with images which correspond to 
substances, they possess no obvious shared meaning. Insofar as propositions including 
such entities can have any meaning, it is only a connection with real entities which 
can bestow it. Ogden ranks as Bentham’s ‘most important insistence ... that words, no 
matter what their other developments in use may be, must, in so far as they are names 
used to refer beyond themselves, be interpreted as referring ultimately to something 
real and observed.’26 As Bentham himself puts it: ‘The whole mass of language will, 
thus, be seen to be divisible into two parts, the real and the fictitious. And throughout 
the whole mass, it is in the real part that the fictitious will be found to have its 
necessary root.’27 Bentham’s techniques for connecting fictitious entities with real 
ones will be discussed further below, but, for the moment, let us return to the relation 
between real entities and truth. 
 Bentham assumes at the outset not only that the world which we perceive 
exists, but that sense experience is capable of delivering accurate information about it. 
The basis for accepting these assertions is twofold. In the first place, our only source 
of information or evidence indicates its accuracy. In the second, while that source of 
information may actually be deceptive, the consequences of accepting the evidence of 
sense are incomparably better than those of rejecting it: 
 
I assume, in a word, the existence of what is called the material world. ... I 
assume it boldly for this reason; because in point of practice, no bad 
consequences can, as every one is ready to acknowledge, possibly arise 
from supposing it to be true; and the worst consequences can not but arise 
from supposing it to be false.
28
    
  
It should be noted that the criterion which very quickly determines the validity of the 
existence of the external world is entirely utilitarian and pragmatic. How do we know 
                                            
24
 ‘Universal Grammar’, UC cii. 456 (Bowring viii. 329). 
25
 See ‘Universal Grammar’, UC cii. 463. 
26
 See C.K. Ogden, Bentham’s Theory of Fictions, London, 1931, p. xlvi. 
27
 ‘A Table of the Springs of Action. Introduction’, in Deontology (CW), p.75. 
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that the evidence we perceive in the sensations we experience is reliable? In short, we 
do not and cannot, since that evidence is the only kind available to us. Bentham 
concedes to Berkeley equally speedily that since our evidence for the existence of the 
material world comes only through sense, it would be strictly accurate to describe 
sensations as the only real entities, with physical objects possessing merely an 
inferential reality, but immediately proceeds on the basis that physical objects do exist. 
At this level, utility, the demand that we prioritize the pursuit of welfare, wins out 
over seeking the truth in relation to a question which, given the informational 
constraints of human existence, we simply cannot answer. 
 A further central premise utilized by Bentham is that reality is binary: things 
either exist or they do not:  
 
Down to this present time—whatsoever be this present time—whether the 
time of writing it or the time of any one’s reading it—whatsoever has 
existed has had existence; whatsoever has not existed has not had 
existence: at this  present time, whatsoever does exist has existence; 
whatsoever does not exist has not existence: and so at any and every future 
point of time.
29
    
 
Bentham repeatedly asserts that it is possible to exchange not only sense, but truth, in 
propositions which relate to the names of real entities. ‘By every name of a real 
entity ... is held up to view an object really existing, an object in relation to which 
assertions, grammatical propositions having more or less in them not only of meaning 
but of truth, are capable of being advanced.’ 30  Such propositions are capable of 
bearing meaning and truth simply because the assertions they contain are verifiable or 
falsifiable by reference to the evidence of sense experience. For Bentham, consciously 
following in an empiricist tradition stretching back through John Locke to Francis 
Bacon, all knowledge of external reality comes through the mediation of sensory 
                                                                                                                             
28
 ‘Key. What things exist’, UC clix. 52. See also ‘Ontology’, UC cii. 15 (De l’ontologie, p. 182 
(Bowring, viii. 197)). 
29
 ‘Ontology’, UC cii. 75 (De l’ontologie, p. 152 (Bowring, viii. 211)). And see also ibid.: ‘At any point 
of time, take any entity—any real entity—whatsoever, between its existence in that place and its non-
existence in that same place, there is not any alternative—there is not any medium—whatsoever.’; 
Rationale of Judicial Evidence, specially applied to English practice (henceforth RJE), Bk. V, Ch. 16 
(Bowring vii. 78); ‘Introductory View of the Rationale of Judicial Evidence’ (henceforth ‘Introductory 
View’, Ch. 12, Bowring vi. 46.  
30
  ‘A Table of the Springs of Action. Introduction’, in Deontology (CW), p. 74.         
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experience and reflection on it: the twin sources of knowledge about reality were 
sensory experience on the one hand, and the active reasoning of the human mind on 
the other. ‘Experience—Observation—Experiment—Reflection on the results of each 
and of all together: these are the means, these are the instruments, by which 
knowledge, such as is within the power of man, is collected.’31 
 Encounters with physical real entities deposited impressions via our sense 
organs—the images created by those impressions being recallable at leisure—and, 
very often, those encounters also produced sensations of pain or pleasure. Bentham is 
careful to caution that the correspondence between perception and reality will not be 
entire; we can err in our interpretation of sensory data, since our knowledge of the 
external world depends not simply on passive perception, but active judgment: 
‘Scarce does a perception take place, but it is accompanied ... with a corresponding 
judgment or act of the judicial faculty.’32 While a fuller discussion appears in § IV 
below, it should be noted at this point that Bentham is well aware such judgment very 
often relies on a cognitive frame through which it imposes order on an otherwise 
chaotic world, and that large elements in that frame are purely mental constructs, 
fabrications of the imagination.
33
 
 The subjects of our most primitive communications were real physical entities, 
to which reference was aided by the links between the entities, the names we gave 
them, and their ideas, or mental images. Such designation, the beginning of both 
language and logic, became embedded in the structure of language and thought, so 
that ‘a material image is the only instrument by which, the only medium through 
which, conceptions can be conveyed from mind to mind’. 34  To exchange sense 
through words is to exchange pictures, mental images, which correspond to states of 
real entities past, present or future.
35
 
                                            
31
 ‘Logic’, UC ci. 183, (Bowring, viii. 238). See also RJE, Bk. I, Ch. 7 (Bowring vi. 241): ‘Experience 
is the foundation of all our knowledge, and of all our reasoning—the sole guide of our conduct, the sole 
basis of all our security.’; ‘Logic’, UC ci. 332 (Bowring, viii. 265): ‘Sense is the fountain from which 
all ideas take their rise’.  
32
 ‘Logic’, UC ci. 118 (Bowring, viii. 224). 
33
 See Postema, ‘Facts, Fictions and Law’, p. 54: ‘On this view, we have sensory access to the external 
world to some extent, but the structure of reality as we know it is the artificial, “fictitious” product of 
the human intellect’. 
34
 ‘Universal Grammar’, UC cii. 463.  
35
 See ‘View of a complete code of laws’, Bowring, iii. 189. 
UCL Bentham Project 
Journal of Bentham Studies, vol. 14 (2012) 
11 
 
 In relation to real entities then, the possibility of speaking the truth is open, 
though accuracy, understood as correspondence to the actually existing nature of 
things, is applicable only to a limited set of assertions:  
 
As every thing that can happen to a corporeal subject is resolvable into this: 
viz. the having been, during the length of time in question, either in a state 
of  motion or in a state of rest, so every thing that can be said, if said to 
have happened to that same corporeal subject, is resolvable either into this: 
viz. that  during the length of time in question it has been, or has been 
capable of being,  in a state of motion—or into this, viz. that it has been, or 
has been capable of being, in a state of rest.
36
 
  
The range of true assertions thus extended only to the ascription of existence, and the 
assertion that the thing existing was either moving or stationary. What is immediately 
striking about this position is that, at least with reference to this limited set of 
propositions, Bentham seems to assert a correspondence theory of truth: truth is the 
assertion of the existence of things which exist, and denial of existence to things 
which don’t exist. As Bentham wrote in relation to a statement communicating the 
recollection of a report, that is an assertion about facts made by another party: ‘To the 
declaration of ... a persuasion of the existence of such recollection—may or may not 
be added, as it may happen, a persuasion concerning—a persuasion affirmative or 
disaffirmative of—the truth—the actual existence—of the supposed matter of fact the 
existence of which was the subject of the report in question’.37 
 
§ II. A paraphrastic excursus.  
As already noted, if we wish to exchange either truth or meaning in relation to the 
names of fictitious entities, the only route lies through their relation to names of real 
entities. The standard definitional method—identifying the genus or type of thing to 
                                            
36
 ‘Universal Grammar’ UC cii. 492 (Bowring, viii. 337). See also Chrestomathia (CW), ‘Appendix IX’, 
p. 398: ‘All language is employed in announcing the existence, absolute or conditional, past, present, or 
future of some event or state of things, or say of some state of things quiescent or moving, real or 
imaginary, i.e. meant to be represented as real, or meant to be represented as imaginary.’ Much earlier 
in ‘PPI’, UC lxix. 234, Bentham had concluded that accurate assertions were in fact possible only in 
relation to stationary substances: ‘Upon a careful and long continued review, I cannot find that we have 
any direct and unfigurative way of bringing into view, by words, any objects of conception besides 
substances, and them only in a state of rest.’ 
37
 Logic, cii. 302 (Bowring, viii. 300). Emphasis added. 
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which an entity belonged, and then adducing a specific difference from other 
members of the same genus—offers no great help, since many fictitious entities have 
no superior genus. Since their bare names deliver neither truth nor meaning, to 
exchange meaning we must focus on propositions, which combine a name, a copula, 
and a predicate, which two latter combine to attribute to the name some quality or 
property.
38
 Hence the first move in any analysis of fictitious entities is phraseoplerosis, 
or, in short, the embedding of the name to be analysed in a proposition. Having done 
that, we move on to paraphrasis, wherein the proposition is replaced by another which 
comes closer to real entities. We continue until we reach a proposition which refers to 
nothing but real entities.
39
 
 According to Bentham, these techniques for expounding fictitious entities in 
terms of real entities permit the exchange of both meaning and truth in relation to 
fictitious entities. If they prove unavailing, if no substitution of a proposition of which 
the subject is a real entity to a proposition of which the subject is a fictitious entity is 
possible, the name in question names nothing, and no proposition of which it is the 
subject can be true or meaningful. However, where such substitution can be made, 
Bentham is clear that truth can be expressed. As he notes with reference to 
propositions employing the fictitious entity obligation: ‘it ought to be possible to 
decipher such language into the language of pure and simple truth—into that of fact. 
To understand abstract terms, is to know how to translate figurative language into 
language without figure’.40 
 Bentham provides us with a formal paraphrasis of neither truth nor utility, 
though he comes much closer with reference to the latter. Here, the real entities which 
supply meaning and truth are the sensations of pleasure and pain. As Bentham puts it: 
                                            
38
 Bentham subsequently appears to have decided that the copula of itself could not indicate existence, 
and that, therefore, a fourth element, a sign of existence (in short, a verb) was necessary to complete a 
proposition: see ‘Universal Grammar’, UC cii. 170, 494 (Bowring, viii. 337). For a helpful discussion 
see P. Schofield, ‘Jeremy Bentham, the Principle of Utility, and Legal Positivism’, in Current Legal 
Problems 56 (2003), 1–39, at pp. 12–13. 
39
 For Bentham’s discussions of the exposition of fictitious entities, see ‘Logic’, UC ci. 217–24 
(Bowring, viii. 246–8; ‘PPI’, UC cxix. 221; Chrestomathia (CW), p. 271–3 n.; ‘A Table of the Springs 
of Action. Introduction’, in Deontology (CW), pp. 74–5; ‘Radical Reform Bill’, Bowring, iii. 593–4 n.  
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originally borrowed to inform the name of a fictitious entity. While most commentators view 
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9. For an attempt to assess the role of archetypation in Bentham’s logic, see M. Quinn, 
‘L’archétypation et la recherche d’images significantes: significant et signifié dans la logique de 
Bentham’, Essaim 28 (2012), 171-81. 
40
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‘Utility is but a quality, a property: a property an act has of encreasing happiness; that 
is of averting pains or encreasing pleasures.’41 In relation to truth, Bentham either 
helped or hindered by making no attempt at paraphrasis. We know that truth is 
predicable of propositions, which are themselves fictitious entities, and we know that 
propositions make assertions. To abbreviate the process, let us eliminate one fictitious 
entity by borrowing Bentham’s gloss of propositions as ‘collections of signs ... 
expressive of the perceptive faculty, considered as having for the source of the 
perception a corporeal objects or objects.’42 Our first step remains phraseoplerosis. 
Let us add a predicate and a copula to our name, using Bentham’s paraphrasis of 
obligation as a model. What about: ‘Truth is ascribed to a collection of signs (i.e. is 
spoken of as belonging to such a collection of signs) expressive of the perceptive 
faculty, considered as having for the source of the perception a corporeal objects or 
objects’. If this be allowed as our fictitious proposition, our paraphrase might be: 
‘Truth is ascribed to a collection of signs (i.e. is spoken of as belonging to such a 
collection of signs) expressive of the perceptive faculty, considered as having for the 
source of the perception a corporeal objects or objects, insofar as it either: a) asserts 
the existence of an entity or entities which do exist, or denies the existence of an entity 
or entities which do not exist; or b) asserts or denies a state of motion or rest of real 
entities, which real entities are in the state of motion or rest it asserts or denies.’ 
 There remain significant problems with this paraphrase, since existence, 
motion and rest are themselves fictitious entities, so that the process is far from 
complete. In relation to motion and rest, since the latter is simply the negation of the 
former, a single exposition will serve. However, it transpires that the attempt to 
explicate motion brings in train further fictitious entities: ‘Necessarily included in the 
idea of motion is the idea of place and time. A body has been in motion when? in 
what case? when having at or in one point of time been in any one place, at another 
                                            
41
 ‘PPI’, UC lxix. 71. See also the longer exposition in IPML (CW), p. 12: ‘By utility is meant that 
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time it has been in any other.’43 The good news is that place and time are directly 
related, in that the linguistic description of time is wholly parasitic on the idea of 
place: we can only conceive of time in spatial terms, as a ‘modification of place’, that 
is as a line stretching from the past, through the present to the future.
44
 If we can 
understand place, we can develop at least an analogous understanding of time. In fact, 
Bentham explicates place itself with reference to the concept of space, understood as 
the absence of body, which he regards as possessing simultaneously elements 
characteristic of both a real and a fictitious entity, and which he designates finally as 
semi-real.
45
 It seems that the completion of our investigation of motion might now be 
in sight, in that having reached space, whether a fictitious entity of the first order (that 
is one that is explicable solely with reference to real entities) or a semi-real entity 
(partaking to some extent in reality), we are very close to real entities. Bentham says 
that ‘place is a relative portion of space, considered either as actually occupied or as 
capable of being occupied, by some real entity of the class of bodies’.46 The final hint 
supplied by Bentham is that motion ‘can no otherwise be defined than by diversity of 
distance’.47 A body (real entity) is in motion when the distance between it and another 
body, or relative point in space is changing. Since distances between bodies will 
equally vary if either moves whilst the other does not, we have a potential problem in 
ascribing motion to the right body. By standing still, I move relative to the club in 
your hand, until my head comes into violent collision with it! Bentham recognizes 
that, to the best of our knowledge, all bodies are, in an absolute sense, in motion, but 
asserts that relative rest will serve for all earthly purposes.
48
 We might then escape 
our confusion by using the notion of relative space, relative that is in having, just like 
a body, boundaries, and dimensions.
49
 Further, since changes in relative distance can 
                                                                                                                             
that truth is thereby rendered, in Bentham’s terms, a fabulous entity: see ‘Bentham, Truth and the 
Semiotics of Law’, 521–2.   
43
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 See ‘Ontology’, UC cii. 47 (De l’ontologie, p. 106 (Bowring, viii. 204)). 
45
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Bentham goes so far as to describe place as a real entity: ‘As to the word place, whether it be 
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47
 Bowring, viii. 334. See also Chrestomathia (CW), ‘Appendix V’, p. 279. 
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 See Chrestomathia (CW), ‘Appendix V’, p. 280–1. 
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 See ‘Ontology’, UC cii. 39 (De l’ontologie, p. 94–6 (Bowring, viii. 202)). 
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only occur over time, we can, in a real sense, only assert motion retrospectively, by 
reference to variation in distance.    
 Before attempting to complete our paraphrasis, we need to address the 
remaining problematic fictitious entity, namely existence, which ‘is in every real 
entity: every real entity is in it’.50 Bentham notes the connection between existence 
and the verb substantive, that is the verb ‘to be’: ‘There is but one simple Verb and 
that is the verb substantive: the word of which the function is to designate existence, 
to whatsoever subject attributed.’51 Whereas all other verbs involve the assertion that 
some quality exists in some subject, the verb to be alone asserts the simple fact of 
existence, of being. In fact, says Bentham ‘the import [of] every verb other than a 
verb substantive is resolvable into the import of the verb substantive added to the 
import of a noun adjective.’52 Having got this far, we have drained the analytical well: 
existence is correctly predicated of real entities which do indeed exist. 
 It is high time to return to our paraphrasis of truth, noting only that the idea of 
existence, like those of motion and rest, presumes the ideas of both place and time: 
 
No state of things can have been in existence but in some place and some 
time,—in some portion of the field of space, and in some portion of the 
field of time. 
Place and time are, accordingly, both of them adjuncts to all existence. 
Existence is a field or ocean which spreads itself at once over both these 
subjacent fields, the field of space and the field of time.
53
 
 
Our first attempt at paraphrasing truth read as follows: ‘Truth is ascribed to a 
collection of signs (i.e. is spoken of as belonging to such a collection of signs) 
expressive of the perceptive faculty, considered as having for the source of the 
perception a corporeal objects or objects, insofar as it either (a) asserts the existence 
of an entity or entities which do exist, or denies the existence of an entity or entities 
which do not exist; or (b) asserts or denies a state of motion or rest of real entities, 
which real entities are in the state of motion or rest it asserts or denies.’ In the light 
of subsequent investigation, we are now, hopefully, in a position to do better. What 
                                            
50
 ‘Ontology’, UC cii. 74 (De l’ontologie, p. 152 (Bowring, viii. 210)). 
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 ‘Universal Grammar’, UC cii. 536 (Bowring viii. 343). See also UC cii. 557 (Bowring, viii. 348).  
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about: ‘Truth is ascribed to a collection of signs (i.e. is spoken of as belonging to such 
a collection of signs) expressive of the perceptive faculty, considered as having for the 
source of the perception a corporeal objects or objects, insofar as it either a) asserts 
that that which is, is, or that that which is not, is not; or b) where, at two successive 
points of time, there is a difference in the interval of  space between a real entity (a 
body) and a particular point in relative space, asserts that that difference is; or c) 
where,  at two successive points of time, there is no difference in the interval of  space 
between a real entity and a particular point in relative space, denies that there is any 
difference.’  
 We have eliminated motion, rest and existence, but have, of necessity, 
imported time and space, while we have taken refuge in the ontological core of the 
verb ‘to be’, in an attempt to capture the essence of truth as correspondence with 
reality. This last move reveals the point at which purely logical analysis runs out of 
steam, so that we end up no great distance from the starting point of all 
correspondence theories of truth. In other words, the truth asserts that that which is, is, 
and that that which is not, is not. 
 
§ III. Criteria of Truth 
Since not all assertions which relate to real entities, directly or indirectly, are true, the 
central problem for human beings who wish to exchange meaningful and accurate 
information about the world is the nature of the criterion by which we differentiate 
between existence and non-existence, and between motion and rest. Now since sense 
experience is the only source of knowledge, that criterion itself reduces to consistency 
with such experience, with observation and experiment. For Bentham, as for the 
pragmatists Peirce and James, the definition of truth remains correspondence or 
agreement with reality,
54
 but possession of such a definition moves us forward not an 
inch. The rather more interesting and urgent question for all these thinkers, as Ayer 
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notes, concerns the criterion by which human beings can tell truth from falsity.
55
 
Bentham would, I think, agree with James that true assertions are in principle 
verifiable,
56
 and be happy to endorse Peirce’s comment that ‘The opinion which is 
fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, 
and the object represented in this opinion is the real.’57 The point, as Perkins notes, is 
that this prioritization shifts the focus from the problem of truth to the problem of 
knowledge.
58
 
 On what basis do we accept a proposition as true, as an accurate reflection of 
reality? Bentham would have sympathised with James’s plaintive protest concerning 
the factual content of a newly discovered truth: ‘The new contents themselves are not 
true, they simply come and are. Truth is what we say about them’.59 But Bentham 
would, I think, dissent from the implication that that which is is ‘not true’. Both 
thinkers are entirely prepared to accept that the world exists independently of human 
actions or language, and for both truth is a human construct, a fictitious entity which 
human beings ascribe to propositions. However, the difference remains that, for 
Bentham, truth is correctly ascribed precisely to things which come and are, and not 
to things which do not come and are not. As will be noted below, James himself, for 
the most part, rejects the idea that subjective human will can render any old assertion 
true. 
 For Bentham, the tool both for forming true propositions about the world and 
for testing them is, of course, Baconian induction. Individual bodies existing in nature 
are perceived by sense, while knowledge advances gradually by the observance of 
conformities between events, and by the successive experimental elimination of 
circumstances observed to attend natural events in particular instances, to exclude 
those only contingently connected to the event. However, Bentham is careful to avoid 
appealing to the fictitious entities causation or law of nature in describing the results: 
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Between this and that group of facts, a certain conformity is observed: 
what is the cause of that conformity? becomes then the question. Cause of 
the conformity?—none at all: the conformity is itself nothing: it is nothing 
but a word expressive of the state our minds are put into by the 
contemplation of  those facts. There are the facts: they do exist: but the 
conformity, as taken for  a fact distinct from the facts themselves, has no 
existence.
60
 
 
 Further, Bentham does not seem to have followed Bacon in believing that 
inductive method could produce conclusive certainty. As Cohen notes, ‘[Bacon’s] 
mistake here sprang from a failure to recognize that in eliminative induction every 
prior assumption about the variety of hypotheses that are open to elimination is itself 
empirically corrigible. We can never be conclusively sure that our list of forms, 
natures, prerogative instances, or whatever is complete. It may turn out that a hidden 
variable was operating in our experiments.’61  Inductive method certainly allowed 
‘setting up degrees of certainty’,62 but the inductive reasoner could never be sure that 
the data from which he reasoned constituted all the relevant evidence. For his part, 
Bentham cautions against the hasty universal application of the propositions of a 
theory which promised to be applicable across a wide range of cases, and 
recommended not the rejection of the theory in its entirety, ‘but only that in the 
particular case inquiry should be made, whether, supposing the proposition to be in 
the character of a general rule generally true, there may not be a case in which, to 
reduce it within the limits of truth, reason and utility, an exception ought to be taken 
out of it.’63 
 For Bentham, certainty was a fictitious quality, which was properly applied 
not to propositions, but to those who espoused them. 
 
Certainty, necessity, impossibility—exhibited seriously in any other 
character  than that of expressions of the degree of the persuasion 
entertained in relation to the subject in question by him whose words they 
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are, in the use of these words is virtually involved the assumption of 
omniscience.—All things that are possible are within my knowledge: this 
is not upon the list. Such being interpreted is the phrase—this thing is 
impossible.
64
    
  
Omniscience was incompatible with human experience: ‘Certainty, absolute certainty, 
is a satisfaction which on every ground of enquiry we are continually grasping at, but 
which the inexorable nature of things has placed for ever out of our reach.’65 In other 
words, Bentham would insist, with the pragmatists, that all inductive truths are 
provisional, and fallible, asserting the best approximation to ‘things as they are’ 
currently available, but corrigible by further experience, experiment and observation. 
Further, whilst individual substances simply have existed, do exist, and will continue 
to exist, truth is the name we apply to consistent inferences from the evidentiary 
product of scientific enquiry. The route to knowledge about real entities lay through 
the Baconian injunction ‘Fiat experimentum’, and through the free dissemination and 
criticism of the inferences drawn from experimental and experiential data. On 
occasion, Bentham forgets his caution on the defeasible nature of inductive inference, 
and insists that some things are simply true: ‘there are facts in abundance, which are 
true without a single exception. Take for instance, that iron is heavier than water.’66 
 For Bentham, the primary referent of all discourse was the state of the 
speaker’s mind, rather than that of the external world. If we sought to communicate 
information about the external world, what we actually communicated were our 
beliefs about it, the result of our active judgment. ‘[W]hen information is professed to 
be given, judgment, vis. the judgment existing or declared to exist concerning the 
matter in question in the mind of the alledged informant, is the utmost that in truth is 
communicated.’67 At this point, the connections between Bentham’s subjectivism and 
objectivism emerge clearly. Statements about the external world communicate the 
speaker’s beliefs about the external world, which beliefs themselves are capable of 
being correct or erroneous, true or false. However, there is an additional way in which 
such statements can be correct or erroneous, true or false, which relates not to the 
external world at all, but simply to the accuracy of the description of the speaker’s 
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state of mind. We can make mistakes, both consciously and unconsciously, in 
reporting our beliefs, which is to say we can misrecollect or make mistaken inferences, 
and we can lie. Just as there are two ways to utter falsehood, so there are two criteria 
of truth, one internal, relating to the correspondence between a statement and the 
actual state of the speaker’s mind (which Bentham designates ‘veracity’), and one 
external, relating to the correspondence between a statement and the actual state of the 
external world (which he usually calls ‘truth’). If my beliefs about the external world 
are false, I will speak falsehood by reporting them accurately, that is by telling the 
truth, while, conversely, I might speak the truth by accident while lying, that is while 
consciously misreporting those beliefs.   
 The two criteria come together in the fictitious entity we call ‘knowledge’, 
which the subjectivist Bentham identifies with absolute conviction: ‘Knowledge, with 
its logical conjugates, composing the verb to know ... expresses the highest degree of 
persuasion possible’.68 However, the objectivist Bentham insists that some criterion of 
correspondence with reality be retained, so that knowledge is synonymous not merely 
with maximally strong belief, but with true belief: ‘A man’s knowledge—every man’s 
knowledge—is proportioned to the extent as well as number of those general 
propositions of the truth of which, they being true, he has the persuasion in his own 
mind.’ 69  In this quotation the subjectivist and objectivist elements in Bentham’s 
scheme are presented side by side. On the one hand, the subjectivist Bentham is led in 
the direction of recognizing as many different truths as there are minds, with truth for 
each of us consisting in the set of propositions in which we believe. On the other, the 
objectivist Bentham insists on the existence of an objective criterion by which these 
multiple subjective truths can be sifted, by which erroneous persuasion can be 
corrected, and by which progress can be made towards a univocal truth which 
corresponds to a univocal reality. 
 Thus the subjectivist Bentham states that the series of fictitious entities which 
correspond to existence, the ‘several modifications’ of existence, that is ‘non-
existence, futurity, actuality, potentiality, necessity, possibility and impossibility’,70 
are doubly fictitious, in not referring, like ordinary qualities, to the attributes of 
existing objects, since that they cannot be properly ascribed to any really existing 
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entities. Instead, ‘Necessity, Impossibility; Certainty, uncertainty; Probability, improbability; 
actuality, potentiality;—whatsoever there is of reality correspondent to any of these 
names is neither more nor less than a disposition, a persuasion of the mind, on the part 
of him by whom these words are employed, in relation to the state of things ... to 
which these qualities are ascribed’.71 When I assert that I am certain about something, 
I share more information about me than I do about that thing. 
 Given that ‘actuality’ features in both Bentham’s enumerations of the fictitious 
qualities concerned with existence, it is striking that truth itself is excluded, 
particularly since the attempt to paraphrase the term took us directly to existence. 
Indeed, if we were to include truth as one of the modifications of existence to which 
Bentham’s stricture applies, we would end up with an anticipation of modern 
deflationary theories of truth. What I communicate by asserting the truth of statement 
x is my internal persuasion that statement x corresponds to reality, that is, my 
acceptance of its content. Deflationary theories of truth take a similar tack, in 
rejecting the notion that truth is a property of propositions, and proposing instead that 
‘truth talk is expressive (enhances the expressive powers of our language) rather than 
descriptive’.72 Ayer too argues that ‘in all sentences of the form “p is true”, the phrase 
“is true” is logically superfluous’, so that ‘the terms “true” and “false” connote 
nothing, but function in the sentence simply as marks of assertion and denial’.73 For 
Bentham, the immediate subject of all propositions is indeed the state of the speakers 
mind, of his beliefs, but propositions concerning real entities also communicate 
information about the world. The ascription by speakers of truth to propositions 
certainly tells us about the state of the speakers mind; the question is, does it add any 
meaningful information to the proposition?  
 Bentham himself certainly asserts that truth is potentially predicable of 
propositions whose subject is a real entity. If this is the case, truth actually does 
double duty, indicating both something objectively meaningful about the 
correspondence between the proposition of which it is predicated and the world, and 
something subjectively meaningful about the belief of the speaker. Whilst Harrison is 
correct in pointing out that ‘there is not (for [Bentham]) any difference in the object 
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between something being true and something being necessary’,74 there is a difference 
between true and necessary propositions, which is that true propositions present 
images deposited by real entities, and in so doing ‘correspond’ to the facts of the 
world, whereas necessary propositions arise out of, and are entailed by, the analytic, 
tautologous premises of a range of formal systems which are themselves the product 
of imagination, of the active human capacities for invention and for the organization 
of information. In short, no object is necessary, but all objects are capable of existing 
or not existing. Such formal systems, which include branches of mathematics and 
indeed language itself, deal with subject matter which is wholly fictitious, and are 
governed by a priori rules of their own making. Further, such systems actually say 
nothing directly about the external world, since the objects about which they reason 
do not exist in the external world. For this reason, it is arguable that the analytical 
‘truths’ of such formal systems fail to qualify, on Bentham’s view, as truths properly 
speaking, since the mark of truth remains precisely correspondence to that external 
world.
75
Such systems are undoubtedly potentially useful, but their usefulness 
absolutely depends upon the resemblance between the wholly fictitious concepts of 
the formal system (the circle, the line, the point) and actually or potentially existing 
real entities.
76
   
 Bentham is quite explicit that the only use of the fictitious qualities like 
necessity which does not assume omniscience is in relation to  
 
A self-contradictory proposition, or two mutually contradictory 
propositions, issuing at the same time from the same mouth or the same 
pen. But here the  objects to which these attributes are with propriety 
applicable are—not the objects for the designation of which the 
propositions are applied, but the  propositions themselves. Propositions 
thus contradictory and incompatible can not with propriety be applied to 
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the same object: that they should is impossible: i.e. inconsistent with the 
notions entertained by the person in question in relation to what is proper 
and what improper in language.
77
  
 
 The linguistic ascription of truth certainly does assert the speaker’s belief in 
the existence of the fact asserted in the proposition, but Bentham wants to retain an 
objective criterion of truth, which involves correspondence with a binary reality, full 
of real entities, propositions about which are either true or false. It is, perhaps, this 
twin characterization of truth as indicative at once of both our persuasion of existence 
and of existence per se, and the difficulties of integrating the subjectivist and 
objectivist elements of his account, which prevented Bentham from associating truth 
with the other modifications of existence. If the fictitious entity truth was to be of use, 
it had to retain an external criterion, it had to be testable in the world, and not merely 
in our minds. In an aside in discussion of Hume’s virtues, Bentham not only repeats 
the external or objective criterion of truth, but immediately delivers quite possibly his 
most tantalizing and frustrating aperçu: 
 
Truth is a fictitious entity. Brissot was misled by it. He wrote a book on 
Vérité ... . He meant the subject matter of knowledge, the result of 
evidence. It is the knowledge of what facts really did exist. Truth is a 
mighty queer sort of personage in the abstract, as slippery as an eel.’78  
 
 The assertion of the truth of a proposition, or the assertion of possession of 
particular knowledge, or the assertion that a speaker is certain about a matter of fact, 
all invite an obvious response from their auditors, namely ‘How do you know? Show 
me the evidence.’ Bentham repeatedly insists on the necessity of freedom of enquiry 
and of expression, and of freedom to disagree. Precisely because the only evidence 
adducible for propositions is itself derived from sense experience, the liberty of 
                                                                                                                             
purpose ... . Amongst other things it may ... be seen how, in point of fact, ... all mathematical ideas 
have their root in physical ones—in physical observations.’  
77
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thought and expression is a necessary condition for the correction of error. Bentham’s 
defence of such liberty occurs most frequently in his critique of the misbegotten 
policy of rewarding the propagation of particular religious beliefs and prohibiting or 
discouraging others, but the point stands more broadly. ‘Soutenir que la liberté de la 
dis[s]ension puisse être au bout de compte défavorable à la vérité, c’est, de toutes les 
erreurs, la plus impudente et la plus monstreuse’.79 What is central is that the means 
for combating falsity in religion is exactly the same as the means of combating falsity 
anywhere else: 
 
De quel remède se servir? il n’y en a qu’un seul: c’est la vérité. Et qui 
autre que la liberté qui puisse administrer ce remède? La qualité 
pernicieuse de ces dogmes déprendra de l’opinion qu’on a de leur vérité. 
Otez cette opinion: le dogme au lieu de pestilentiel n’est plus que ridicule. 
Or comment l’ðter cette opinion? comme on ðtait toute autre. Ce n’est pas 
avec le galive que les opinions se détruissent, c’est avec la plume.80 
 
In other words, progress towards knowledge and truth is made by testing, and 
contesting, assertions about reality, by displaying errors and correcting them.
81
 All 
assertions are primarily statements of our own persuasion, but that emphatically does 
not imply that all assertions are equally valid. We cannot simply choose to believe 
whatever we like, since the faculty of understanding is governed by evidence. 
 
Now, what is in man’s power to do, in order to believe a proposition, and 
all that is so, is to keep back and stifle the evidences that are opposed to it. 
For, when all the evidences are equally present to his observation, and 
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equally attended to, to believe or disbelieve is no longer in his power. It is 
the necessary result of the preponderance of the evidence on one side over 
that on the other.
82
 
 
 The faculty of will, however, is governed by pain and pleasure, and there are 
resources available to the will to be deployed in clouding the understanding, which 
boil down to the decision to look the other way, that is, ignore or disregard 
inconvenient evidence. Bentham’s discussion of the range of methods for looking the 
other way is strikingly similar to Peirce’s analysis of flawed methods for attaining the 
fixation of belief, that is, of rendering belief unassailable by doubt.
83
 Tenacity (simple 
refusal to consider evidence to the contrary), authority (refusal to think on the ground 
that someone else has done it for us), and the a priori method (that is, begging the 
question by assuming the truth of the contested premise in the construction of the 
enquiry) would all look very familiar to Bentham, with the latter two especially 
receiving extended discussion in his discussion of political fallacies.
84
 
 Postema notes that the condition for universal agreement in relation to the 
assessment of a body of evidence depends on the existence of ‘universal cognitive 
competence’.85 At times, Bentham assumes just such a capacity, though at others he 
analyses the internal factors which prevent its achievement. In presenting what he 
calls ‘pragmatic epistemological realism’, Habermas provides an echo of Peirce’s 
definition of truth as that which would be believed after exhaustive enquiry. 
Habermas draws attention to external, rather than internal, obstacles to consensus, 
central to which are inequalities of power. Truth then emerges as the quality of 
propositions which would be adopted as a result of fully inclusive, uncoerced 
participation in dialogue aimed at mutual understanding: ‘Accordingly, a proposition 
is true if it withstands all attempts to invalidate it under the rigorous conditions of 
rational discourse.’ 86  Whilst presenting a rather more reductionist account of the 
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conditions of rational discourse, Bentham has the same sort of image in mind when he 
argues that publicity is a necessary condition for worthwhile political debate: ‘It is the 
characteristic of error to possess only an accidental existence, which may terminate in 
a moment, whilst truth is indestructible’.87 Error is accidental in the sense that it 
remains open to correction by access to fuller evidence, while the indestructibility of 
truth refers at once to both the binary nature of existence (things either did exist or 
they did not), and ability of true propositions to withstand criticism. 
 As noted above, for Bentham it possible to speak the truth in propositions 
concerning fictitious entities, insofar as they can be interpreted as ‘the intended and 
supposed equivalent ... of—some proposition having for its subject some real entity’, 
insofar, that is, as they can be translated from necessarily figurative language into 
language without figure, into the language of ‘fact’. Indeed, the language of truth is 
simply the language of fact, where fact is defined as ‘The existence of any expressible 
state of things, or of persons, or of both, whether it be quiescent or motional or both, 
at any given point or portion of time’.88    
 The paraphrasis of obligation in terms of the real entities pain and pleasure 
achieves precisely this connection to the language of truth or of fact. Similarly, the 
explication of the obscure fictitious entity ‘title’ in terms of ‘dispositive events’, 
eliminates the figurative in favour of the factual: ‘To say that an event has happened, 
is to speak the language of simple truth—is to announce a fact which presents an 
image to the mind—it is to present a picture which could be painted’.89 The reason 
facts are facts is that they are in principle testable, that observation, experiment and 
experience can provide evidence of their falsity or truth, and that the best available 
evidence indicates the latter rather than the former. If I wanted to make assertions 
capable of truth as well as falsehood, I needed to refer to facts, and this was as true of 
moral reasoning as it was of ordinary reasoning: ‘Truth can operate only by 
supporting evidence’.90  As Bentham noted with enthusiasm with reference to the 
refounding of moral discourse on the basis of pleasures and pains: ‘Of moral science, 
the only true and useful foundations are propositions enunciative ... of facts; viz. of 
the existence of human feelings, pains or pleasures, as the effects of this or that 
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disposition of law’.91 The great thing about facts was precisely their capacity to be 
confirmed or disconfirmed by evidence: ‘This thing, I say, causes such and such sorts 
of pains, and such and such sorts of dangers—here they are. I have averred a fact. Is it 
true? Is it not true? Any one is my judge.’92 
For Bentham, normative statements are thus a particular sort of factual 
statements, making him allegedly guilty of the naturalistic fallacy.
93
 As Schofield 
argues, Bentham would have rejected the idea that deriving prescription from 
description was an error, since there was simply no where else whence to derive it.
94
 
However, to endorse utilitarianism as against asceticism and the principle of 
sympathy and antipathy requires two further moves which do not themselves depend 
on facts, but upon specifically moral premises. The first move, which consists in 
accepting what Bentham thinks is the foundational principle of rationality, namely 
that pleasure is preferable to pain, serves to see off asceticism. The second, which 
consists in accepting the egalitarian moral premise that the legislator has no reason for 
preferring the happiness of one individual to that of another, debars the 
sympathist/antipathist from prioritizing the welfare of those to whom he is well-
disposed as against that of those to whom he is ill-disposed. Bentham makes both 
moves, though the second is never expounded at length.
95
 He would assert, I think, 
that the sympathist/antipathist will simply not be able to adduce any facts from which 
to derive his substantive moral premises, whilst any attempt so to do will perforce 
oblige him to engage in what is, in effect, utilitarian reasoning.    
 
§ IV. Bentham, pragmatism and fictionalism. 
Lee contrasts Bentham’s inductivist position (‘although utility informs the direction 
and search for truth, truth is not defined in terms of utility’) with that of William 
James (‘truth is simply reduced to utility’).96 Lee recognizes that, for Bentham, the 
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universal desire to pursue pleasure and avoid pain informs our search for truth, in that 
our exploration of the external world is guided by interest: ‘Knowledge is established 
through an interplay of truth and utility, of the nature of the agent with its particular 
type of sense organs and interests on the one hand, and the world at large within 
which such agent is operating on the other.’97 For his part, James would not dissent 
from this statement, and it appears that the alleged difference between the two men 
consists in the status of the knowledge thus acquired, which for Bentham ‘is real, not 
arbitrary and dependent on the subjective will of the agent. That fire burns is true not 
simply because it is useful; it is true, and it is useful in so far as it is true.’98 However, 
the implication that James thinks that fire burns simply because it is useful constitutes, 
to say the least, a considerable misrepresentation of James’s position.     
  
The importance to human life of having true beliefs about matters of fact is 
a  thing too notorious. Ideas that tell us which of them to expect count as 
the true ideas ..., and the pursuit of such ideas is a primary human duty. 
The possession of truth, so far from being here an end in itself, is only a 
preliminary means towards other vital satisfactions. … since almost any 
object may some day become temporarily important, the advantage of 
having a stock of general extra truths, of ideas that shall be true of merely 
possible situations, is obvious. … Whenever such an extra truth becomes 
practically relevant to one of our emergencies, it passes from cold-storage 
to do work in the world, and our belief in it grows active. You can say of it 
then either that ‘it is useful because it is true’ or that ‘it is true because it is 
useful.’ Both these phrases mean exactly the same thing, namely that here 
is an idea that gets fulfilled and  can be verified. True is the name for 
whatever idea starts the verification process, useful is the name for its 
completed function in experience.
99
 
 
James, like Bentham, accepts the independent reality of matters of fact, and, like 
Bentham and Peirce, refers to the observed regularities of experience, and the way in 
which predictions based on those regularities are verifiable by further experience. 
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‘Truth, in these cases, meaning nothing but eventual verification, is manifestly 
incompatible with waywardness on our part. Woe to him whose beliefs play fast and 
loose with the order which realities follow in his experience; they will lead him 
nowhere or else make false connections.’100 In other words, rhetorical flourishes aside, 
just as with Bentham, empirical knowledge, and true beliefs about the world—for 
instance the belief we hold when lost and hungry in the forest that man-made paths 
are likely to lead us to assistance—are useful because they are true, and disregarding 
empirical truth, because it would be useful if the false were actually true, leads to 
disaster. 
 However, there is still room for disagreement, and it centres on the question of 
what constitutes verification, and what exactly does verification verify? In discussing 
the status of the terms used in forming hypotheses, and in making predictions, James 
argues that the fictitious, or the plain false, can be rendered ‘true’ by the fact that ‘it 
works’:  
 
Scientific logicians are saying on every hand that these entities and their 
determinations, however definitively conceived, should not be held 
literally for real. It is as if they existed; but in reality they are ... only 
artificial short-cuts for taking us from one part to another of experience’s 
flux. We can cipher fruitfully with them; they serve us wonderfully; but 
we must not be their dupes.
101
   
  
Atoms, electrons, and all the other hypothetical constructs developed to explain 
observed regularities are ‘true’ for James, just in so far as they allow for a ‘process of 
conduction from a present idea to a future terminus, provided only it run 
prosperously’, 102  where run prosperously means results in a pay-off in terms of 
verification by observational data which match the observations predicted by the 
theoretical model. Truth starts and ends with sensory data, with observable facts, and, 
for James, the verification of the intermediate theoretical model building, of the 
invention of new fictitious entities with attributes which promise to explain and 
predict the world more effectively, comes precisely in their success in so explaining 
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and predicting. James has attracted enormous philosophical criticism simply for 
allegedly identifying truth with utility,
103
 and he does seem to imply, even while 
denying the literal truth of theoretical constructs, that such constructs, once invented 
by the model builders, are rendered retrospectively true by the utility of their 
predictive power. We end up in the paradoxical position of asserting that a theory 
which is self-consciously fictional can be verified to the extent that its predictions are 
borne out by the most exacting empirical experiments. As we shall see, there are 
passages in which Bentham sounds positively Jamesian in his approbation of the rich 
harvest drawn from fictitious entities in science. However, I do not know of any 
passage in which Bentham asserted that the retrospective utility discovered in the 
deployment of fictitious entities rendered them true.  
If pragmatism is criticised for confounding truth with utility, fictionalism 
abandons the pursuit of truth altogether.
104
 As expressed by Hans Vaihinger, it is the 
fundamental contradiction between the physical world—the chaotic flux of reality as 
detected by sensation—and the conceptual world—the product of the active thought 
processes by which human intellect seeks grasp, understand and manipulate that 
world—which renders the effort to understand the world in terms of a correspondence 
theory of truth a forlorn quest. Whilst Vaihinger would agree with Bentham that 
sensations are the only real data, the only foundation available to human beings for 
making sense of the world, the ‘psyche works over the material presented to it by the 
sensations, i.e. elaborates the only available foundation with the help of logical 
forms’.105 These logical forms are emphatically fictitious: ‘The differentiation of the 
chaos of sensations into “thing and attributes”, into “whole and parts” etc, is a purely 
subjective achievement’,106  with no basis in reality. Indeed, fictions, in imposing 
order on chaos, not only contradict reality but are self-contradictory. However, since 
the role of thought is not to reflect reality but to manipulate it, the legitimacy of a 
fiction depends not to its truth but, as for the pragmatists, on its usefulness, ‘on the 
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practical corroboration, on the experimental test of the utility of the logical structures 
that are the product of the organic function of thought.’107 
For Vaihinger, as for Bentham, we find ourselves surrounded by a world that 
is real, and to which our access is mediated by the sensory, empirical data which 
provide both the starting point and terminus for all logical activity. Whilst Vaihinger 
would dispute the validity of sense experience as a description of reality, since the 
psyche alters reality even as it perceives it, he would endorse the reality of empirically 
verifiable experimental and observational data. For him, there is such a thing as 
knowledge, and it consists in ‘the establishment of an unchangeable sequence and co-
existence (or at any rate one that has not changed within our field of observation)’.108 
 Bentham too is acutely aware that in their efforts to describe the physical 
world, human thought, and its instrument language, actively construct a purely mental 
model of the world. He recognizes that basic categories of human thought (matter, 
form, quality, quantity) are indeed fictitious entities. If we want to exchange meaning 
about fictitious entities, the easiest way is to speak as if they were physical objects, 
even though this is a misdescription. It is this metaphorical substantification of the 
immaterial which gives rise to confusion, since it is seen everywhere in language, 
whether in the constructions ‘in motion’, ‘at rest’, or in the naming of properties or 
qualities: apples exist, many apples are ripe, but ripeness is a fictitious entity which 
we locate in ripe apples.
109
 The logical analysis by which ‘ripeness’ is first abstracted 
from a real apple, then designated as a noun substantive in its own right, and then 
attributed to other similarly coloured objects itself abounds in fictions, false 
propositions about the world, since ripeness relies on the existence of real objects in 
which it might inhere, and has no independent existence. Bentham certainly 
anticipates Vaihinger in regarding many of the basic categories with which thought 
seeks to understand the world as fictitious entities.
110
 However, while they both regard 
qualities as fictitious, for Bentham, the particular bodies to which qualities are 
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attributed are impeccably real.
111
 For Vaihinger, conversely, there is no thing apart 
from its qualities, while both are equally fictions.
112
 The question is, are these 
constructivist elements in Bentham’s thought sufficient to render him a fictionalist? 
For Vaihinger, as for James, good theoretical models produce accurate 
predictions of observational and experimental data, so that the criterion of a good 
model is entirely pragmatic: good models are good guides to action.
113
 However, the 
theoretician and the model-builder know very well that the abstract concepts which 
feature in the theory have no basis in reality, while ‘the fiction is the acceptance of a 
statement or a fact although we are certain of the contrary’.114 C.K. Ogden, who 
edited Bentham’s writings on logic, also translated Vaihinger’s major work, and not 
only appears to endorse fictionalism, but asserts that Bentham had anticipated the 
central elements of that philosophy.
115
 However, Vaihinger himself makes no 
reference to Bentham’s logic, and his discussion of Bentham is limited to a brief 
consideration of whether the latter viewed the assumption that all human motivation 
was self-interested as a fiction—a self-consciously false but useful idea—or as an 
hypothesis—an empirically testable assertion—while he concludes that Bentham 
failed to appreciate the difference between the two.
116
 Conversely, for Lee, Bentham’s 
inductivist epistemological commitment to correspondence between sensation and 
reality ensured that he was no more an anticipator of Vaihinger than he was of James. 
On this account, Bentham simply refuses to abandon the search for facts: ‘What is 
true has its basis in reality or may be said in some way to be a reflection of it.’117 
Vaihinger then, is thought to err in jettisoning the idea of truth understood as 
correspondence to external reality.  
 Among modern commentators, Stolzenberg explicitly concludes that Bentham 
was, in effect, a fictionalist, and argues that he introduced the distinction between real 
and fictitious entities only to subvert it immediately: ‘the category of the fictitious 
effectively swallows up the domain of the real by the time Bentham finishes his 
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analysis’.118 She dismisses Bentham’s statements that real entities exist, and that we 
can exchange truth in relation to them, on the basis that such passages are ‘more than 
offset’ by the combination of his assertion that the reality of substances is, strictly 
speaking, inferential, and her own assertion (which Bentham explicitly contradicts) 
that he regarded perceptions and ideas as ‘the paradigmatic fictions’.119 In their subtle 
and sympathetic discussion, Cléro and Laval also read Bentham as a fictionalist. Their 
references to the fluid boundary between truth and fiction in Bentham, and to the 
possibility that real and fictitious entities can exchange their status in the move 
between different contexts and different purposes, are reminiscent of Vaihinger: ‘Par 
la fiction, il s’agit toujours d’affirmer le faux que l’on sait être faux, comme s’il se fût 
agi de vérité.’120 
 It should be recognized that there is some textual support for the fictionalist 
reading, since there are occasions on which Bentham does seem directly to anticipate 
key elements of Vaihinger’s account of fictions. Thus, in discussion of the method of 
Newtonian fluxions—which employs a conscious fiction in that: ‘a point, or a line, or 
a surface, is said to have kept flowing where in truth there has been no flowing in the 
case’121—he recognizes that the use of fictions can lead to the acquisition of new 
knowledge. His insistence in such cases is ‘not that no such fictions ought to be 
employed, but that to the purpose and on the occasion of instruction, whenever they 
are employed, the necessity or use of them should be made known.’122 Further, in his 
Universal Grammar, Bentham defines non-figurative language not as language 
without figure, since almost all language is figurative, but as language ‘in which, for 
the conveyance of the immaterial part of the stock of ideas conveyed, no other 
fictions—no other figures—are employed than what are absolutely necessary to, and 
which consequently are universally employed in, the conveyance of the import 
intended to be conveyed.’123 These examples do appear to open methods other than 
paraphrasis for the rehabilitation of fictitious entities: they can be justified by 
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necessity (we simply cannot speak without them), and by utility (they allow us to 
calculate right answers to problems which were previously insoluble). 
 A final example of the proto-fictionalist Bentham might be advanced in his 
statement that ‘A body (real entity) is an aggregate of fictitious entities. Bodies (Real 
entities) are distinguishable by the fictitious entities (properties) they are known to be 
made up of’.124 Postema interprets this passage as recognition that we change the 
world in perceiving it. ‘In short, the sensory manifold is “decomposed” into a large 
number of notable fictitious entities. Hence, the real concrete object (or its sensory 
impact on the mind) is, from the point of view of the active mind, an aggregate of 
fictitious entities.’125 There is, however, a more minimalist interpretation which, while 
recognizing that the active mind’s deconstruction and reconstruction of the real 
concrete object is indeed motivated by the pragmatic desire for well-being, insists that 
nothing in that mind’s operation prejudices the reality of real entities. On this view, 
Bentham’s statement is better interpreted as one more repetition of the distinction 
between bodies, which are real, and their qualities, which are the fictitious creations 
of that active mind, where fictitious means simply non-existent in the absence of any 
real entities in which to inhere. 
 According to Rosen, Bentham is ‘clearly some sort of fictionalist about his 
theoretical invocations of fictitious entities. These claims (though theoretically 
convenient and possibly “indispensable”) are not strictly true’.126 However, Bentham 
may not qualify as a fictionalist proper, because he does not appear to subscribe to the 
proposition which forms the ‘distinctive commitment’ of fictionalism, namely that 
‘the ultimate aim of discourse in the area is not (or need not be) to produce a true 
account of the domain, but rather to produce theories with certain “virtues”—virtues a 
theory may possess without being true’. 127  The central virtues of theory are 
explanatory power, capacity to unify and organise observational data, and, crucially, 
predictive accuracy. Rosen recognizes the tensions in Bentham’s views, and declines 
to endorse either a fictionalist or a realist reading, noting however, that insofar as he 
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believes paraphrasis uniquely capable of delivering truth in relation to fictitious 
entities, Bentham sounds very like a reductionist realist.
128
 
 In essence, it all depends on what Bentham means by translating ‘figurative 
language into language without figure’, or by the fictitious having its ‘necessary root’ 
in the real.
129
 If it means simply that the employment of fictitious entities in a 
theoretical model gives rise to predictions about the condition of real entities (or 
sensory data) which can be corroborated by observation of those entities (or by 
experimental and observational data), Bentham might plausibly be read as a proto-
fictionalist. However, if Bentham’s repeated claims for paraphrasis are taken seriously, 
and fictitious entities incapable of successful paraphrasis are thereby illegitimate, he is 
no fictionalist, but cleaves to truth understood as the accurate description of reality. 
Paraphrasis rehabilitates fictitious entities precisely by eliminating the falsehood—the 
assertion that the fictitious entity has real, independent existence—involved in 
propositions which contain them. 
 There are two major problems with the fictionalist interpretation of Bentham. 
First, even allowing for his inconsistencies of expression on this topic, it would surely 
be quite remarkable for a writer as pre-occupied with clarity as he, to state his position 
in such an esoteric fashion, that is by insisting on the importance of ‘the 
comprehensive and instructive distinction—between real entities and fictitious entities: 
or rather between their respective names’, 130  which he actually regards as no 
distinction at all. Stolzenberg entirely overlooks paraphrasis (overlooks that is, 
Bentham’s apparatus for speaking truly or comprehensibly about fictitious entities), 
and this omission surely undermines her interpretation, since Bentham’s statements 
that real entities do exist, that truth can be spoken about them, and that the key to the 
legitimate use of fictitious entities lies in their explication in terms of real entities, are 
not contained in one or two isolated passages, but constitute the bulk of the textual 
evidence. If Bentham thinks that there is no possibility of exchanging truth, why does 
he insist repeatedly that there is, straightforwardly in relation to real entities, and, in 
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relation to fictitious entities, via their analysis in terms of real ones?
131
 What is it that 
he thinks is gained by the process? 
 Second, if Bentham were to accept that there were no ontological distinction 
between real and fictitious entities, he would be denying to utilitarianism its most 
effective weapon in the struggle with competing moral theories. Since Vaihinger 
allows that sensations, at least, are real, Bentham might be saved by the insistence that 
the entities which do the bulk of his work are sensations rather than objects, but such 
a defence comes perilously close to forfeiting the anchor in reality which he asserts to 
be the essential virtue of his utilitarianism. Thus the superiority of the principle of 
utility over the principle of sympathy and antipathy, or ipse-dixitism, consists 
precisely in the reliance of its conclusions on matters of fact, that is, on the real 
entities constituted by pleasure and pain. To abolish the distinction between real and 
fictitious entities is to reduce Bentham, in his own terms, to just one more ipse-dixitist. 
 There is no obvious reconciliation between the reductionist-realist and 
fictionalist readings of Bentham. It is perhaps conceivable that he believed different 
attitudes to fictions to be appropriate in different contexts. Thus, paradoxically, but on 
impeccable utilitarian grounds, he might well endorse Vaihinger’s fictionalism in 
natural, but not in legal science. If fictional theoretical constructs like gravity, atoms, 
and the rest generate good models, and thereby good predictions, which are testable 
by the observational data, and which are flexible enough to be revised when the 
observational data contradict them, what does it matter that the concepts which make 
up the model do not actually exist as real entities? However, in the area of Bentham’s 
primary interest, morality and law, he believes that the investigation-stymieing 
consequences of deference to unparaphrasable fictions has been a disaster, and that, 
therefore, a thorough revision of language is urgently necessary. That revision takes 
the form of interpreting the fictitious entities in which legal discourse abounds in 
terms of real entities, and specifically the entities of pleasure and pain. Such a revision 
would at once produce significant progress toward truth (understood as accurate 
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reference to that which exists), and an equally significant gain in utility, since, in this 
sphere at least, truth and utility stand or fall together. 
 Ultimately, it is the rooting of utility in the real entities of pleasure and pain—
that is to say the exposition of the fictitious entity utility in terms of alleged facts 
which are themselves capable of empirical verification or falsification—which makes 
utility useful: it is the only acceptable moral principle because (discounting asceticism) 
it is the only moral principle whose alleged dictates are capable of truth or falsehood. 
In morals at least, then, Bentham would endorse Lee’s reading that there can be no 
conflict between truth and utility because only the true can in fact be useful: ‘Any 
construct, which itself does not refer to a real entity and is not reducible to others 
which do, is bound to lead to disutility.’132 For Bentham, whilst the value of true 
propositions is indeed to be subjected to utilitarian evaluation, the very possibility of 
utilitarian evaluation itself depends on the existence of such things as true 
propositions. The chicken of utility and the egg of truth are very likely, therefore, to 
remain forever locked in a mutually supporting embrace. 
 
§ V. The useful versus the true 
As Russell points out, in order to tell whether truth and utility go together we need to 
be able to tell them apart, that is, we need an independent criterion of truth.
133
 
Whatever might be said of William James, Bentham does distinguish between the two, 
and can therefore meet this challenge. The question is, to which fictitious entity does 
Bentham cleave when they conflict? On the one hand, as noted above, there is no 
doubt that for Bentham, the foundational principle of rationality is that the sensation 
of pleasure is to be preferred to that of pain. On the other, for the most part, accurate 
knowledge about the world is precisely what underpins our predictions of the pleasant 
or painful consequences of particular actions. However, if experience were to indicate 
that being guided by truth, that is, by the best available approximation to an accurate 
description of reality, issued in increased pain, in comparison with being guided by 
error, that is by a description of reality which we know to be mistaken, it might be 
rational to embrace error in preference to truth. 
 Although this strategy might be utility-maximizing, it is, as has been noted, 
impossible for us simultaneously to attend fully to the relevant evidence and to 
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believe in assertions plainly contrary to that evidence. However, it has also been noted 
that human beings are capable of wilful failure to attend to evidence. In addition, the 
question arises most urgently when we are in possession of truths and make decisions 
not to share them with others. Generally, utilitarian lies arise from the desire to refrain 
from inflicting avoidable pain. In a scenario where serious harm would clearly be 
avoided by lying—for instance in answer to the enquiry from the vicious criminal 
about the whereabouts of his intended victim—a utility calculation would almost 
certainly indicate that deliberate falsehood was at least justifiable, if not obligatory.  
 For Bentham, the value of veracity as a virtue depends, like the value of all 
virtues, solely upon its consequences: ‘no act can with propriety … be termed 
virtuous except in so far as in its tendency it is conducive to the sum of happiness’.134 
According to this criterion, there can be no doubt that, in general, veracity has 
overwhelmingly good consequences in terms of utility. Indeed, ‘The habit of veracity 
is one of the great supports of human society—a virtue which in point of utility ought 
to be, and in point of fact is, enforced in the highest degree by the moral sanction.’135 
While it may be the case that particular falsehoods might be useful, every particular 
falsehood contributes to undermine the habit of truth-telling. The reason that veracity 
is so crucial to society is summed up by Bentham as follows: 
 
Happiness, in almost all its points, is, in every individual ... more or less 
dependent on knowledge; the word knowledge not being on this occasion 
confined in its application to the knowledge of those recondite facts which 
belong to the domain of science. But in all cases, except that of a life 
carried on from beginning to end in a state of perfect solitude, knowledge 
depends in the largest proportion upon testimony: and ... it is only in so far 
as it is expressive of truth, that testimony is productive of knowledge.
136
 
 
In other words, we take an awful lot of knowledge on trust: ‘At every moment of our 
lives, we are obliged to build our judgments, and to direct our conduct, upon the 
knowledge of facts, of which there are only a few that can pass under our own 
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observation.’137 The important question for the utilitarian legislator, given that very 
few of us, if any, possess the leisure and the skill necessary to evaluate the evidence 
supporting all the assertions which we take for granted, is whether it is justifiable for 
the legislator to mislead us for our own good, whether, that is, ‘Government house 
utilitarianism’ is a rational methodology of government.138 
 Whilst recognizing the value of transparency on impeccably Benthamic 
grounds, Lazari-Radek and Singer argue that utilitarians are in principle obliged to 
follow Sidgwick in endorsing esoteric morality, that is to say, in recommending 
duplicity in relation to cases where lying has the best utilitarian consequences, and we 
can be confident that the truth will not emerge.
139
 In so far as Hooker’s rule-
utilitarianism rejects such an esoteric morality, it is held to have abandoned 
consequentialism altogether.
140
 Bentham would, I think, accept the logic of 
Sidgwick’s position, but would believe that the condition of maintaining secrecy 
reduces to a minimum the number of cases in which such a morality might be called 
into action. Remember, ‘no act can with propriety … be termed virtuous except in so 
far as in its tendency it is conducive to the sum of happiness’. To rule out duplicity 
always and everywhere simply is to reject the calculation of the probable 
consequences of an action. However, Bentham’s empirical answer to the question of 
‘Government house’ utilitarianism is both tolerably clear, and defensible. In general, 
the strategy will not work, because the lie will be discovered. The evidence of sense 
perception is available to all, and the factual evidence is available to all. Of course, all 
human beings, being subject to sinister interest, interest-begotten prejudice and 
adoptive prejudice, are liable to engage in fallacious reasoning in order to carry a 
point, but fallacious reasoning is detectable. 
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 Bentham allows himself to flirt briefly with misinformation in his analysis of 
punishment, where he draws a distinction between the real and the apparent value of a 
punishment. The real value is the pain which the offender actually suffers, whilst the 
apparent value is that which the watching public believe him to suffer. Bentham 
asserts that by exploiting the property of exemplarity, which increases the apparent 
punishment, the value of the real punishment may be reduced: 
 
It is the idea only of the punishment (or, in other words, the apparent 
punishment) that really acts upon the mind; the punishment itself (the real 
punishment) acts not any farther than as giving rise to that idea. It is the 
apparent punishment, therefore, that does all the service, I mean in the way 
of  example, which is the principal object. It is the real punishment that 
does all the mischief.
141
 
 
Whilst the obvious way of increasing the apparent punishment is by increasing the 
real, there are, says Bentham, less expensive—meaning less pain inflicting—means, 
one of which consists in ‘a particular set of solemnities distinct from the punishment 
itself, and accompanying the execution of it’.142 It is tempting to indulge in a happy— 
meaning less pain inflicting —fantasy, wherein, to impress the public, the judge dons 
his black cap, and performs a ritual condemnation of the offender, perhaps to suitably 
grave musical accompaniment, before the offender is led behind a screen to begin his 
minimally painful actual punishment, part of which involves the obligation to scream 
at the top of his voice in simulation of acute pain.
143
 Of course, such a fantasy 
breaches Bentham’s first rule of proportion, which is that the punishment must 
outweigh the expected profit from the offence, but it does so only in relation to the 
tiny minority of the population who are actually convicted of offences. With respect 
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to them, the legislator seems to have forfeited the ability to influence their future 
behaviour in a good way, although a credible threat that any repeat offence would be 
followed by a severe dose of real pain might do the trick. However, Bentham 
explicitly notes that deterrence of potential offenders through example is far and away 
the most important end of punishment ‘in proportion as the number of persons under 
temptation to offend is to one’,144 whilst that deterrent effect depends not on the real 
punishment, but precisely on the apparent punishment. 
 A more serious objection to the policy is that public knowledge of the 
disjunction between the real and the apparent punishment would eliminate the 
disjunction, thereby destroying the desired exemplary effect, and bringing the entire 
justice system into disrepute, while the relevant point is that the public would be very 
likely to find out. We might prolong the fantasy by imagining ‘Offender protection 
programmes’, under which, in order to maintain the secret, our compliant offender 
and his family are secretly relocated and equipped with a new identity, but setting 
aside any issues of cost, the overwhelming likelihood is that the secret would leak, 
and our brilliant scheme to economise on suffering would fail. 
 In his writing on Indirect Legislation, Bentham responds to an objection that 
rewarding informers is wrong, because it constitutes public incitement to breach of 
trust (in effect, lying), and breach of trust is always wrong: 
 
The proposition then that to violate promises is immoral, if given as an 
universal one is not true. 
There are cases in which the violation of a promise  is not immoral: and 
this is one of them. But it may be said, admitting this distinction to be just 
in itself, is it such an one as the people will enter into? The case, let it be 
admitted, is one that ought to be regarded as an exception to the rule. But 
will the people actually regard it in that light? In the case in  question the 
violating of a promise is not immoral: ... granted: but will not the people in 
general think it so? ... [it] is one of the cases in which, the people being 
liable to go wrong, it should be the care of government to instruct them 
and set them right. In this view the following are the tasks which the 
legislator should perform. Recognizing the truth of the rule in general, he 
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should give a list of the exceptions. He should, moreover, shew the reason 
which there is for the exceptions as well as for the rule. It would then 
appear, that they both depended on the same principle; that of utility; that 
there was as much reason for the one as for the other: and the reasons in 
favour of the exceptions did but confirm the sacredness of the rule in all 
other cases that did not fall within them.
145
 
  
 Here, the legislator makes a public declaration of the utilitarian rationale of the 
rule which rewards information leading to the prevention or detection of crimes, and 
engages with the public concerning the utilitarian justification for lying to people who 
trust us. Now the rule that informers will be rewarded is a public rule, and, like all 
public rules, it requires a rationale, and that rationale, for Bentham, can come only 
from the indication of the consequences of the rule on the future experience of 
pleasures and pains by all the sentient beings affected by it. As Hooker notes, ‘What 
defining ethics in terms of public rules must oppose is (not permissible secrecy in 
general but) secrecy about moral rules.’ 146  Bentham makes no secret of his 
commitment to the overarching moral imperative of utility, and insists on the 
cognoscibility and promulgation of the rules intended to guide conduct. I may still be 
justified in calculating that the utility-maximizing option in a particular case is to lie, 
on the basis that my duplicity will remain undetected. If my lie is discovered, my only 
prospect of avoiding moral or legal sanctions is to come clean about the reasoning 
which led to it. If my utility calculation stands scrutiny, I have some grounds to hope 
that those sanctions will not be applied, that is, I will be spared punishment. Of course, 
whether coming clean will have the best consequences overall, as well as offering me 
a possible escape from sanctions, will itself depend on the probable consequences of 
so doing. 
 Errors in popular perception, false beliefs on the part of the ruled, do present 
the legislator with the problem of how far he ought to attempt to correct them. For 
instance, the general psychological tendency to optimism had already been noticed by 
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many writers, was noticed by Bentham,
147
 and, according to the latest researches of 
neuroscientists, remains alive and well.
148
 Since this Micawberish fantasy is a 
delusion, ought the legislator to attempt to combat it, even at the cost of eliminating 
thereby a large quantity of pleasure, since pleasure derived from the contemplation of 
erroneous beliefs is no less real than pleasure derived from the contemplation of true 
beliefs? The answer depends on two judgments, the first concerning the consequences 
of the prejudice in terms of pleasure and pain, and the second concerning the 
consequences of any attempt to correct it. In relation to the first, it might be argued 
that irrational optimism has good consequences in both the short and the very long 
term, but might have bad consequences in the medium term. Thus my current 
expectation that things will turn out well supplies pleasure as long as it lasts, while its 
prevalence might provide evidence of its being an evolutionary advantage. 
Conversely, Bentham was alarmed by the widespread pains consequent upon the 
tendency, particularly prevalent among the poor, of failing, during the youthful years 
of relatively high wages and low outgoings, to make any provision for old age. He 
certainly thought it conceivable that the benefit of avoiding these pains could justify 
the legislator in levying compulsory pension contributions to make provision for old 
age.
149
 
 In relation to the second, Bentham considers the means available to the 
legislator in combating popular prejudices, and concludes that they reduce to patient 
instruction.
150
Given that existing prejudices are data relevant to the utilitarian 
calculation, it is hardly surprising that Bentham subjects any measure which opposes 
them but which would, in itself, be useful, to utilitarian calculation: ‘the measure is 
still to be put into execution, if the good of it to them promises to be greater than the 
evil of their dissatisfaction at the thought of it.’151 
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 In general, Bentham appears confident that the dissemination of knowledge 
will lead to a gradual reduction in the gap between both public perception and reality 
(or rather the best currently available approximation thereto), and between public 
opinion and the dictates of utility. He is not opposed to public funding of enquiry in 
the pursuit of knowledge, or indeed of the public funding of the dissemination of 
factual information, but is profoundly hostile to the publicly funded dissemination of 
particular conclusions. Once again, the particular target he has in mind is the 
established church, which he believes to be the disseminator of falsehoods. In so far 
as Bentham believes the religious sanction to play a positive role in supporting 
acceptable moral standards, there is a tension here between the utility of religious 
belief, and the lack of evidentiary basis for that belief. The tribute to religion as 
possessing important utility in supplying the deficiency in the legislator’s power ‘by 
inculcating upon the minds of men the belief that there is a power engaged in 
supporting the same ends, which is not subject to the same imperfections’, 152  is 
revealed as the statement of Dumont rather than Bentham, but Bentham himself made 
an equivalent statement in IPML.
153
 Despite this, the vast bulk of Bentham’s 
discussion in ‘Délits religieux’ consists in the denunciation of the offences of religion, 
in fostering belief in an afterlife where most of us are damned to eternal suffering, and 
shifting our focus away from the real world of experience, which is the only proper 
context for the sanctions of reward and punishment.
 154
 The other surviving discussion 
which does place religious belief in a positive light, in ‘Rationale of Reward’, also 
appears in a work edited by Dumont, and so comes attached with a considerable 
caveat. That said, the discussion puts the question as to whether the utilitarian 
legislator ought to make an exception to the prohibition on providing rewards for the 
avowal of the truth of particular opinions: 
 
It may be said, that an exception ought to be made from the rule, in cases 
wherein, on whichever side the truth may be, the utility is clearly on the 
side thus favoured. Thus there is use, for instance, in the people’s 
believing in the being and attributes of a God: and that even in a political 
view, since upon that depends all the assistance which the political can 
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derive from the religious  sanction: and that there can be no use in their 
disbelieving it.
155
 
 
The discussion goes on to admit that insofar as such a belief is indeed useful, it 
certainly requires to be taken into account. However, given the disutility arising from 
the state’s embrace of hypocrisy, in publicly asserting the truth of assertions without 
factual basis, and thereby fostering mendacity and devaluing veracity, the strong 
likelihood is that the costs of such a policy will outweigh the benefits, at least that 
seems to be the most plausible interpretation of the hesitant and ambiguous 
conclusion: ‘If, then, the interests of religion be at variance with those of virtue, and it 
be necessary to endanger the one in order to promote the efficacy of the other,—so 
then must it be.’156     
  For Bentham, the possibility of the religious noble lie appears ruled out by 
what Crimmins describes as his moral atheism, that is, the view that ‘actions are right 
or wrong, good or evil, without reference to God’.157 Whether or not God existed in 
some sense undetectable by sense, he was quite irrelevant to morality. The religious 
sanction could not be a reliable support to morality because the operation of the 
sanction took place outside the realm of sense experience. Any effective morality had 
to work, and be seen to work, within that realm. Any legislator who publicly asserted 
the truth of religion spoke nonsense, whilst Bentham expected the removal of state 
support of religion to result in a significant erosion of religious belief and religious 
practice. However, the legislator should refrain from applying punitive sanctions to 
such belief or practice, unless such belief and practice led directly to the infliction of 
harm on others, thereby leaving it up to individuals to believe or withhold belief 
according to their taste. 
 Bentham did recognize that some people found in their faith a source of 
comfort and happiness, though the admission extended only to those according to 
whose faith the religious sanction worked only through reward, that is, by the promise 
of heaven, and not through punishment, that is, by the threat of hell: ‘He who is 
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inbred with so delightful a persuasion, let him not divest himself, let not any one seek 
to divest him, of it: no service can compensate for such disservice.’158 
More generally, asserting the truth of potentially useful lies comes close to 
being ruled out by the availability of the evidence of sense experience to everyone. 
After all, morality would require no legal enforcement at all if only everyone believed 
that immoral behaviour led ineluctably to misery, but the all too visible apparent 
happiness and material success enjoyed by some apparently immoral people provides 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary.  
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